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I. Introduction 
Imagine living as Tom Hanks in the movie “The Terminal.”1  You arrive at JFK 
International Airport, only to find your passport is not valid because the United States no longer 
recognizes your birthplace as a sovereign nation.  Denied from entering U.S. territory, you 
wander the airport—lacking money, lacking a home, and lacking an identity. To some extent, 
American citizens born in Jerusalem face this same identity crisis.  Jerusalem has been the 
                                                 
1 See THE TERMINAL (Amblin Entertainment June 18, 2004). 
 2 
subject of a tug-of-war for centuries, claimed by many as not only the center of religion but also 
as a state capital.
2
  At the same time, Jerusalem sits in isolation, unrecognized in modern history 
as belonging to any nation.
3
  The United States recognizes no state as having sovereignty over 
Jerusalem, instead treating the ultimate determination of Jerusalem’s status as a matter to be 
resolved between the Israelis and Palestinians.
4
   
Although less drastic than eternally wandering an airport, ten-year-old Menachem 
Binyamin Zivotofsky, along with 50,000 other American citizens, has lived the entirety of his 
short life in a “terminal” of sorts simply because he was born in Jerusalem.5  Menachem, an 
American citizen by virtue of his parent’s American citizenship, was denied the simple right, 
afforded to most United States citizens, of having his country of birth listed on his passport and 
Consular Reports of Birth.
6
  Because he was born in Jerusalem, Menachem is instead set apart, 
with his documents displaying only “Jerusalem” as his birthplace.7  In some sense, by American 
standards, Menachem lives in a “no-man’s land,” having no country of birth with which to 
identify.   
Congress attempted to remedy Zivotofsky’s situation by enacting § 214(d) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Year 2003, and affording the approximate 50,000 American 
citizens born in Jerusalem the right to list “Israel” as their place of birth.  This right was short-
lived, however, and Menachem was never allowed to list “Israel” as his place of birth because of 
the Department of State’s refusal to enforce the statute.  Instead, a legal battle ensued and still 
continues today. 
                                                 
2Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 396 (6th ed. 2010). 
3 Id. 
4 Brief for the Appellee at 3–4, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, No. 07-5347 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 10, 2012). 
5 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) [hereinafter Zivotofsky 1]. 
6 Id. at 1425.  
7 Id. 
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Menachem’s fate currently sits with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is in the 
unenviable position of determining an issue of first impression that will lead to political strife 
regardless of the position it takes.  The issues in this case implicate not only the balance of power 
between two federal branches of United States government, but also foreign policy, national 
security, and geopolitical relations that go beyond a simple word on a passport. The D.C. Circuit 
must carefully investigate constitutional issues affecting separation of powers dating back to the 
United States’s inception. 
This Comment analyzes separation of powers between Congress and the executive as it 
relates to § 214(d).  Part II introduces the circumstances leading to the current question before 
the D.C. Circuit—whether Congress had the power to pass § 214(d) as appropriate passport 
legislation or whether it is an impermissible encroachment on executive power.  Part III 
examines whether the power over passports belongs to Congress, the President, or both by 
introducing a framework for scrutinizing separation of powers’ conflicts.  Additionally, Part III 
considers the passport power’s relationship with the Constitution’s “receive ambassadors” 
clause, which grants the President authority to recognize foreign sovereigns.  After analyzing § 
214(d) to determine whether it conflicts with the President’s recognition authority in Part IV, 
Part V introduces the unitary executive theory, a concept that seeks to define the scope of 
executive power.  Part V also examines the unitary executive theory’s effect on the President’s 
authority to recognize foreign sovereigns.  This analysis of the recognition clause as it relates to 
the unitary executive theory seeks to establish one critical point.  The common understanding of 
the power to receive ambassadors undermines the system of checks and balances among the 
federal branches and must therefore be reassessed in order to reaffirm presidential accountability.  
 4 
These points of analysis lead to the conclusion, which argues that § 214(d) is should be upheld as 
a check on executive authority.  
II. Background 
A. Act 1: Framing the Conflict 
The status of Jerusalem is one of the most emotionally charged and sensitive issues to be 
resolved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The key to understanding the conflict over Jerusalem is 
recognition of the “different geographical concepts” favored by the two sides.8  Palestinians 
claim East Jerusalem, including the Old City, as the capital of a Palestinian state.  Israel refuses 
to relinquish control or divide its “eternal capital.”9  For the last sixty years, the United States has 
maintained a policy of taking “no official act recognizing Israel’s or any other state’s claim to 
sovereignty” over Jerusalem because of the executive’s assessment that any action taken to 
recognize Jerusalem as within the sovereign territory of one nation would compromise the 
United States’s ability to work with the parties in the peace process.10  According to the 
government, the United States implements this policy in part by placing restrictions on place-of-
birth designations in consular reports of birth abroad and passports issued to American citizens 
born in Jerusalem.
11
  Where other passports list the country of birth as the citizen’s birthplace, 
the passports of Americans born in Jerusalem list only “Jerusalem.”12 
In 2002, Congress attempted to change the government’s policy by enacting the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (“Act” or “the Act”).13  Section 214 of the Act is 
entitled “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel.”14  Section 
                                                 
8 Bickerton & Klausner, supra note 2, at 396. 
9 Id. 
10 Brief for the Appellee, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
11 Id. at 4.  
12 Id. 
13 See FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, PL 107–228, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat 1350. 
14 Id. at 1365–66. 
 5 
214(a) contains a “Congressional Statement of Policy,” which reaffirms Congress’s commitment 
to relocating the United States Embassy in Israel from its current location in Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem and urging the President to begin the process of relocation.
15
  Section 214(b) limits 
funding of United States’ diplomatic facilities in Jerusalem to those under the supervision of the 
United States Ambassador to Israel.
16
  Section 214(c) forbids the use of funds appropriated by 
the Act in publication of official government documents listing countries and their capitals 
unless the publication identifies Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
17
  Section 214(d), the only 
provision at issue in this case, states: 
Record of Place of Birth As Israel for Passport Purposes.—For purposes of the 
registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a 
United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary [of State] shall, 
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of 
birth as Israel.
18
 
 
In signing the Act into law, President George W. Bush stated his belief that § 214(d) is 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional authority 
to “formulate the position of the United States, speak for the Nation in international affairs, and 
determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.”19  The President 
emphasized that there was no change in United States policy regarding Jerusalem due to § 214’s 
enactment.
20
 
President Bush referred to the executive’s recognition power in his signing statement to 
argue that § 214(d) is unconstitutional.  Derived from Article II, § 3 of the Constitution, the 
recognition power gives the President the authority to “receive [foreign] Ambassadors and other 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, The American 
Presidency Project (Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928. 
20 Id. 
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public ministers.”21  This authority traditionally included the ability to recognize or not recognize 
a foreign state or government.  The recognition power implicates birthplace designation in 
passports and consular reports of birth because, as a general rule, the United States Department 
of State records the country it recognizes as having sovereignty in the place of birth slot in 
passports.
22
  Where the United States does not recognize a particular nation’s sovereignty, the 
country name is not recorded.
23
   
B. Act 2: Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem shortly after § 214 was enacted 
to two American parents, making him a United States citizen by virtue of his parents’ 
citizenship.
24
  His mother filed an application for a consular report of birth abroad and a United 
States passport, requesting that “Jerusalem, Israel” be recorded as his place of birth.25  In 
response, U.S. officials informed her that State Department policy forbids recording “Israel” as 
her son’s place of birth.26  Pursuant to United States policy, the State Department issued a 
                                                 
21 U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 3. 
22 6 Immigration Law Service 2d PSD Foreign Affairs Manual 1300 APP D (“[T]he country that currently has 
sovereignty over the actual place of birth is listed as the place of birth, regardless of when the birth occurred….For a 
location whose sovereignty is in dispute, is not yet resolved, or is not recognized by the United States, this appendix 
provides specific guidance.”). 
23 Id.  Similarly, an applicant objecting to listing a country that currently has sovereignty has the option of listing the 
city of birth.  Id.  For example, a citizen born in undisputed Israeli territory who objects to having “Israel” listed may 
instead list the his or her city of birth.  If the person was born prior to Israel’s inception in 1948, he or she may list 
“Palestine.”  The Foreign Affairs Manual also lists various options for American citizens born in disputed Israeli—
Palestinian territory.  Id.  For example, a person born in the Gaza Strip or West Bank may list “Gaza Strip,” “West 
Bank,” “Palestine” if born prior to 1948, or the city or town of birth.  Id.  A person born in the Golan Heights may 
list “Syria” or the city or town of birth.  Id.  Also, a person born in Jerusalem prior to 1948 may list “Palestine.”  Id. 
24 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(c)–(d) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: . . . (c) a 
person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the 
United States and one of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to 
the birth of such person; (d) a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of 
whom is a citizen of the United States who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying 
possessions for a continuous period of one year prior to the birth of such person, and the other of whom is a national, 
but not a citizen of the United States.”); see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971) (“children of American 
citizens born outsize the United States acquire citizenship at birth through “congressional generosity”). 
25 Zivotofsky 1, 132 S. Ct. at 1425. 
26 Id. 
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passport and consular report of birth abroad listing only “Jerusalem” as Zivotofsky’s  
birthplace.
27
 
 Zivotofsky’s parents filed a complaint against the Secretary of State on his behalf, 
seeking a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction ordering the Secretary of State to 
identify “Jerusalem, Israel” as his place of birth in his official documents.28  The District Court 
dismissed the case, after the parties agreed that the issue should be whether § 214(d) entitled 
Zivotofsky to have “Israel” rather than “Jerusalem, Israel” listed as his birthplace, on the grounds 
that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question.
29
  The court reasoned that 
resolution of the issue would “necessarily require the Court to decide the political status of 
Jerusalem.”30  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the 
Constitution grants to the executive the exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns, an 
exercise of power not reviewable by the courts.
31
  One judge sitting on the panel, Judge Edwards, 
believed the majority and the District Court were incorrect and analyzed the issue in a concurring 
opinion.  Judge Edwards determined that the issue was justiciable and that Congress lacked 
constitutional authority to enact § 214(d).
32
   
In reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court first noted that the lower 
court misunderstood the issue: “Zivotofsky does not ask the courts to determine whether 
                                                 
27 Id. 1425–26. 
28 Id. at 1426. 
29 Id. (2012) (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
30 Zivotofsky 1, 132 S. Ct. at 1426 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 
(D.D.C. 2007)). 
31 132 S. Ct. at 1426. 
32 Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2009) vacated and remanded sub nom. Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (U.S. 2012).  Judge Edwards explained that the issue was whether 
“Congress impermissibly intruded on the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns” and that this 
determination involves “commonplace issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation” which are “plainly 
matters for the court to decide.”  Id. at 1234–35.  Judge Edwards determined that the issue gives the court “no 
occasion” to decide a political question.  Id. at 1235.  In reaching the merits, Judge Edwards concluded that the 
President’s passport policy regarding Jerusalem is an exercise of the President’s plenary recognition power and 
found § 214(d) an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.  Id. at 1241. 
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Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.  He instead seeks to determine whether he may vindicate his 
statutory right, under § 214(d), to choose to have Israel recorded on his passport as his place of 
birth.”33  The Court reframed the issue as merely determining whether the statute is 
constitutional, or whether it impermissibly intrudes on the President’s constitutional powers.34  
The Court cited Marbury v. Madison, emphasizing that when a congressional act allegedly 
conflicts with the Constitution, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.  That duty will sometimes involve the resolution of litigation 
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches, but courts cannot avoid 
their responsibility merely because the issues have political implications.”35  Although the Court 
went on to address the parties’ arguments, it ultimately concluded that the case should be 
remanded because the lower courts never reached the merits of the case.
36
   
As a result, the D.C. Circuit must determine the question on its merits.  The court will 
need to examine the relationship between the President and Congress in the foreign policy arena 
as it pertains to the recognition of foreign sovereigns.
37
  This case presents an issue of first 
impression because courts have not had occasion to determine the constitutionality of a statute 
that attempts to override the President’s recognition decision.38  
III. From Passports to Recognition 
A. Passport Power 
                                                 
33 132 S. Ct. at 1427. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (internal quotations omitted). 
36 Zivotofsky 1, 132 S. Ct. at 1430. 
37 U.S. CONST. ART II, § 3. 
38 Brief for the Appellee, supra note 4, at 25; Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original 
Understanding of Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2011). 
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Congress derives its legislative power over passports and birth registrations from Article I 
of the Constitution, which grants authority over immigration and foreign commerce.
 39
  Despite 
this authority, Congress traditionally endorsed executive authority with regard to passports.
40
  It 
first delegated power over passports to the executive through the Passport Act of 1856, providing 
that the “Secretary of State shall be authorized to grant and issue passports … under such rules as 
the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States.”41   According 
to the Court, “[t]he Act was passed to centralize passport authority in the Federal Government 
and specifically in the Secretary of State.”42  This is not to say that Congress cannot revoke or 
modify this delegation of power.
43
  Congress cannot, however, use its authority to trench upon an 
independent executive power.
44
  This necessarily raises the question of whether the President has 
inherent constitutional authority to regulate the place of birth designation on passports and 
consular reports of birth. 
B. Standard for Evaluating Presidential Authority: Justice Jackson’s Tripartite 
Scheme 
                                                 
39 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To…regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations…establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization…”); see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 231 (1824) (Marshal, 
C.J) (“The right of Congress over navigation, and the transportation of both men and their goods, [is] not only 
incidental to, but actually of the essence of, the power to regulate commerce.”); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 
280, 293 (1981) (“As a travel control document, a passport is both proof of identity and proof of allegiance to the 
United States. Even under a travel control statute, however, a passport remains in a sense a document by which the 
Government vouches for the bearer and for his conduct.”). 
40 Haig, 453 U.S. at 293. 
41 Id. at 294. 
42 Id. 
43 See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (INS) v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 926, 953 n. 16 (1983) (“Executive action is 
always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceed it is open to 
judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely.”); see also Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[A]n administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative 
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”). 
44 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 37–38 (2d ed. 1996) (“Limitations on 
Congressional power are implied in grants of power to the President…”). 
 10 
 The scope of inherent presidential authority is addressed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.
45
  Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, delineated three zones of presidential 
authority.
46
  First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right 
plus all that Congress can delegate.”47  In these circumstances, the President’s acts are 
presumptively valid.
48
  Next, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a 
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.
49
  This zone involves situations in which Congress and the President 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
50
  Finally, “[w]hen the 
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power 
is at its lowest ebb.”51  In these situations, where the President is disobeying federal law, as is the 
case in Zivotofsky, he can rely only on his own constitutional powers and his actions are 
legitimate only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional.
52
 
C. Recognition Power 
In Zivotofsky, the Secretary of State continually relied on the executive’s “plenary” 
recognition power to argue that § 214(d) is unconstitutional.  There has been debate, however, 
over whether the recognition power is meant to be exercised as a substantive and plenary 
presidential power or whether it is understood to merely be a duty to “receive” diplomats, 
                                                 
45 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
46 Id. at 635-9 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Justice Jackson’s concurrence was later adopted into law in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
47 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 637. 
50 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 668—69 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39). 
51 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). 
52 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 341 (3rd ed. 2006) (citing Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 637). 
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leaving a recognition “power” held concurrently with Congress.53  Although cases discussing the 
recognition clause refer to it as plenary, no court ever addressed a conflict between a 
congressional statute and presidential exercise of the recognition power.
54
  The implications of 
concluding that the recognition power is plenary are substantial.   
First, and foremost in this case, § 214(d) will inevitably be struck down as 
unconstitutional if the court also finds that recording “Israel” as place of birth is the equivalent of 
recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the disputed capital.  In the broader context, given the 
current state of world politics, where governments are overthrown with more and more 
regularity, finding that the recognition power is plenary means that the President will have final 
and untouchable authority each time a new regime is created, regardless of past treaties or 
relations.
55
  To determine whether the Constitution granted the President this type of final 
authority, the D.C. Circuit must examine both the original understanding of the recognition 
clause as well as the evolution of the doctrine throughout United States’s history. 
 On its face, the Constitution does not describe the authority to receive ambassadors as a 
‘power’ at all.56  Rather than being included within the clause describing presidential powers, it 
is in the subsequent section and “seems a function, an assigned duty, a ceremony that in many 
countries is performed by a figurehead.”57  Further, whereas § 2 of Article II grants the President 
                                                 
53 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 204 (1987); David Gray Adler, The President’s Recognition 
Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 141 (Univ. of Kansas Press 
1996); Brief for Petitioner at 35, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699) 2011 
WL 328837. 
54 Reinstein, supra note 38, at 806.  Further, judicial statements referring to the recognition as a plenary executive 
power are found in dicta.  Id.  
55 Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 3 
(2011) (“Over the last few months, we have witnessed an unprecedented wave of unrest and revolutionary fervor—
furor in North Africa and the Middle East, including among some of our long-time allies . . . . In the blink of an eye, 
the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt have been toppled, and protest movements have erupted in Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, 
and others. . . .”). 
56 HENKIN, supra note 44, at 37–8; ADLER, supra note 53, at 41.Reinstein, supra note 38, at 813. 
57 See U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2; HENKIN, supra note 44, at 37–8.  In its third clause, the Constitution states that the 
President “shall appoint” ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls.  Id. Although not characterized as powers, 
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authority to make treaties and appoint ambassadors with the consent of the Senate, § 3 places no 
such limitations on the receipt of ambassadors.
58
  If this clause actually grants substantial plenary 
power to the Executive, “it would be a remarkable singularity in the Constitution—giving a 
unilateral royal prerogative to the President.”59  In view of the Framers’ aversion to monarchy 
and fear of executive prerogative, granting the President unilateral recognition authority would, 
as discussed below, fly in the face of the system of checks and balances intended by the Framers 
and “would have been contrary to [] the constitutional design for collective decisionmaking.”60  
Given the Constitution’s restrictive language, it seems unlikely that receipt of ambassadors was 
meant as a final and unchallengeable executive authority.  
Early commentary on the recognition clause also indicates the Framer’s meant for receipt 
of ambassadors to be a mere functionary duty.  In the first post-Constitutional convention 
commentary on the reception clause, Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
to receive ambassadors and other public ministers … is more a matter of dignity 
than authority.  It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the 
administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be 
arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the 
legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though 
it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.
61
 
 
James Madison wrote that the executive’s receipt of ambassadors “involve[s] no cognizance of 
the question, whether those exercising the government have the right along with the possession” 
and “[t]he questions before the executive are merely question of fact; and the executive would 
have precisely the same right, or rather be under the same necessity of deciding them, if its 
                                                                                                                                                             
these appear in the section that lists various Executive powers.  Id.  In contrast, receipt of foreign ambassadors is in 
the subsequent section, which does not mention ‘powers’ but merely lists things the President “shall” or “may” do.  
Id. 
58 Adler, supra note 53. 
59 Reinstein, supra note 38, at 815. 
60 Adler, supra note 53., at 147. 
61 Id. at 140 (quoting The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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function was simply to receive without any discretion to reject public ministers.”62  Moreover, 
Madison argued, “little if anything more was intended by the clause, than to provide for a 
particular mode of communication…by pointing out the department of the government most 
proper for the ceremony of admitting public ministers….”63  According to the Framer’s original 
understanding of the Constitution, it seems that little consequence was attached to the President’s 
dignitary recognition authority. 
 The idea of a substantive recognition power did not arise until several years after the 
Constitution was enacted, during the French Revolution.
64
  In Pacificus, Hamilton stated,  
[t]he right of the executive to receive ambassadors and other public 
ministers….includes that of judging, in the case of a revolution of government in 
a foreign country, whether the new rulers are competent organs of the national 
will, and ought to be recognized, or not; which, where a treaty antecedently exists 
between the United States and such nation, involves the power of continuing or 
suspending its operation….This power of determining virtually upon the 
operation of national treaties, as a consequence of the power to receive public 
ministers, is an important instance of the right of the executive, to decide upon the 
obligations of the country with regard to foreign nations.
65
 
 
It can be argued that Hamilton’s about-face can be seen as an evolution in his, and the nation’s, 
understanding of the recognition clause as a result of the French Revolution.  On the other hand, 
Hamilton’s drastic change could merely have been an attempt to re-characterize the reception 
clause as a result of political concerns at the time.
66
  In 1793, Hamilton’s highest prerogative was 
preventing the United States from being pulled into the French wars as a result of a pre-existing 
                                                 
62 Id. at 146 (quoting Richard Loss, ed., The Letters of Pacficus and Helvidius 76 (Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints 
1976)). 
63 Id. (quoting Richard Loss, ed., The Letters of Pacficus and Helvidius 76 (Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints 
1976)). 
64 Adler, supra note 53., at 141. 
65 ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS ON THE PROCLAMATION OF 
NEUTRALITY OF 1793 12–13  (J. and G.S. Gideon 1845). 
66 Adler, supra note 53., at 144. 
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alliance with France.
67
  To do so, Hamilton connected the determination to recognize a foreign 
government to the suspension of pre-existing treaties.
68
  
 As is the case with Hamilton’s about-face, political concerns become a common thread in 
analysis of the recognition clause.  This is not to say, however, that political concerns change the 
meaning of the Constitution as it was originally conceived.  As originally conceived, both 
facially and in the Framer’s commentary, the receipt of ambassadors was not meant to be a 
power at all.
69
  In finding that the recognition clause merely conveys dignitary authority, one 
must thereby conclude that, at best, there is uncertainty as to which body possesses the power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns.  One can argue that that the executive’s refusal to recognize 
“Israel” as sovereign over Jerusalem is instead presumptively valid under the first part of the 
tripartite scheme, as it was acting pursuant to an express congressional authorization in the 
Passport Act of 1856.
70
  On the other hand, § 214(d) is arguably a revocation of the Passport 
Act’s delegation of power, placing the executive’s refusal to comply in Justice Jackson’s third 
category.
71
  In this case, the President cannot rely on his own constitutional “power” to refuse 
issuance of Zivotofsky’s requested passport.72    
 Despite the Framer’s intent, the recognition clause has come to be understood as 
conferring a power on the President.  Constitutional intent only goes so far “[b]ecause  a 
foundational principle of the law is that to some degree what the law is on the books is 
                                                 
67 Id. at 143. 
68 Id. at 144–46. 
69 Adler, supra note 53. 
70 Haig, 453 U.S. at 293 
71 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51. 
72 Id. 
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determined by what is in practice.”73  In the case of the recognition clause, shifting practices 
have caused more confusion than clarity.  
 Relations between the executive and Congress implicating the recognition power 
traditionally focused more on politics than on understanding constitutional intent.  In the early 
nineteenth century, the United States considered recognition of the independence of certain 
South American provinces from Spain.
74
  When first considering the question of recognition, 
President Monroe prepared a memorandum asking several questions: 
Has the executive power to acknowledge the independence of new States…?   
Will the sending or receiving a minister to a new State under such circumstances 
be considered an acknowledgment of its independence? ….  
Is it expedient for the U. States at this time to acknowledge the independence of 
Buenos Ayres…?75 
 
These questions indicate President Monroe’s uncertainty over whether recognition was “really 
within the competence of the executive.”76  Legislative actions that followed displayed a strong 
congressional opposition to executive power over recognition.
77
  In 1817, Speaker of the House 
Henry Clay announced his intention to move for recognition of Buenos Aires in Congress and 
subsequently introduced a bill appropriating $18,000 for the salary of a minister to be sent to the 
de la Plata provinces.
78
  Opponents defeated the bill for “interfering with the functions of the 
executive….and [the executive] received a direct confirmation of its ultimate right to determine 
whether a government was to be recognized or not.”79  Clay renewed his resolution in 1820, 
when sentiment in the country was overwhelmingly in favor of recognition, and the bill passed 
                                                 
73 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008). 
74 JULIUS GOEBEL, THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (1915). 
75 Id. at 120. 
76 Id. at 121. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 123 (citing 32 Annals of Cong. 1468–69 (1818). 
79 Id. at 124; see also 32 Annals of Cong. 1570 (1818) (statement of Rep. A. Smyth) (“[T]he acknowledgment of the 
independence of a new Power is an exercise of Executive authority’ consequently, for Congress to direct the 
Executive how he shall exercise this power, is an act of usurpation.”). 
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by a narrow vote; however, it was never implemented.
80
  In 1821, Clay again took up the fight 
for a resolution recognizing the South American provinces, but this time emphasized the interest 
that United States citizens had in South America’s success and changed the bill to a non-binding 
motion supporting the President in recognizing sovereignty “whenever he may deem it 
expedient.”81  This time, the bill passed by a large majority.82  It was not until the following year, 
however, that President Monroe finally recognized the South American provinces.
83
 
 In contrast, in 1836, President Jackson acquiesced to a congressional resolution calling 
for the recognition of the Republic of Texas following its revolution against Mexico.
84
  President 
Jackson observed that the question of which body of government possessed the recognition 
power was unresolved: 
Nor has any deliberate inquiry ever been instituted in Congress, or in any of our 
legislative bodies, as to whom belonged the power of originally recognising a new 
state – a power, the exercise of which is equivalent, under some circumstances, to 
a declaration of war – a power nowhere expressly delegated, and only granted in 
the constitution, as it necessarily involved in some of the great powers given to 
Congress; in that given to the President and Senate to form treaties with foreign 
powers, and to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers; and in that 
conferred upon the President to receive ministers from foreign nations.
85
 
 
Notably, the President concurred with Congress’s resolution on the ground of expediency 
because of the possibility of war, and as a result chose not to “express any opinion as to the strict 
constitutional right of the Executive, either apart from, or in conjunction with, the Senate over 
the subject.”86  He did so under the idea that, when recognition could lead to war, the decision 
                                                 
80 GOEBEL, supra note 74, at 131–32. 
81 Id. at 133. 
82 Id. at 133–34. 
83 Id. at 135. 
84 Message from the President of the United States Upon the Subject of the Political, Military and Civil Condition of 
Texas, H.R. Doc. No. 24–35, at 1 (2d Sess.) (December 22, 1836). 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. 
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should be left to the body that can declare war.
87
  Additionally, President Jackson presumed that 
no future dispute would arise between the Executive and Congress on the question of the 
recognition power.
88
 
 In 1896, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations put forth a joint resolution 
acknowledging the independence of the Republic of Cuba.
89
  The Secretary of State responded in 
a public statement: 
The Power to recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State 
rests exclusively with the Executive.  A resolution on the subject by the Senate or 
by the House…is inoperative as legislation, and is important only as advice of 
great weight, voluntarily tendered to the Executive, regarding the manner in 
which he shall exercise his Constitutional functions.
90
 
 
When Congress again proposed recognizing Cuban independence and considered intervening in 
the Cuban revolution, President McKinley objected, stating, 
Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene 
and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any 
particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of 
international obligation toward the organization to be recognized.
91
 
 
As a result, Congress dropped the language of recognition from the resolution, and instead 
expressed its view that the people of Cuba had the right to be “free and independent.”92 
 Similarly, in 1919, the Senate considered withdrawing recognition of Mexico.   President 
Wilson responded in a letter stating that the resolution would “constitute a reversal of our 
constitutional practice which might lead to very grave confusion in regard to the guidance of our 
                                                 
87 GOEBEL, supra note 74, at 158. 
88 Message from the President of the United States Upon the Subject of the Political, Military and Civil Condition of 
Texas, H.R. Doc. No. 24–35, at 2 (2d Sess.) (December 22, 1836). 
89 Congress Powerless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1986. 
90 Id. 
91 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1901). 
92 Id. at 125.  The statute originally read “That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and 
independent, and that the government of the United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and 
lawful government of the island.”  Id. (emphasis in original). The words in italics were dropped following the 
President McKinley’s statement.  Id. 
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foreign affairs.”93  Shortly thereafter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced that 
the resolution was “dead.”94 
 The earliest courts provided little clarity to the recognition clause, examining only 
whether the judiciary could recognize foreign governments, but not examining fully the role of 
the political branches .
95
  The court in Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. decided a case in which the 
American government had not recognized Buenos Aires’s claim of sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands.
96
  Justice Story, sitting as a Circuit Justice, wrote, “[i]t is very clear, that it belongs 
exclusively to the executive department of our government to recognise, from time to time, any 
new governments, which may arise in the political revolutions of the world… .”97  Justice Story 
shed some light on the judiciary’s understanding of the recognition clause in his 1833 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.
98
  First, Justice Story explained why an 
action that at first seems to be merely a dignitary duty became a substantial power.  He reasoned 
it is “obvious” that “simple acknowledgment of the minister of either party” might be deemed 
taking a side in a conflict over sovereignty and is therefore “an executive function of great 
delicacy.”99  As a result, receipt of an ambassador is the equivalent of de facto recognition of the 
sovereign authority of a new nation or a party in the civil war of an old nation.
100
  Justice Story 
next noted that the recognition power might be concurrent.  The executive’s recognition 
                                                 
93 Wilson Rebuffs Senate on Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1919, at 1. 
94 Id. 
95 See United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440, 442 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (“[B]efore it could be considered 
independent by the judiciary of foreign nations, it was necessary that its independence should be recognized by the 
executive.”); Williams v. Suffolk Ins Co, 29 F. Cas. 1402, 1404 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (“[U]ntil such new 
governments are so recognised, they cannot be admitted by our courts of justice to have, or to exercise the common 
rights and prerogatives of sovereignty.”); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 44 (1849) (“[N]o court of the United 
States…would have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful government; or in treating as 
wrongdoers or insurgents the officers of the government which the President had recognized.”). 
96 Williams, 29 F. Cas. at 1403. 
97 Id. at 1404. 
98 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1560 (Boston 1833). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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determination is conclusive unless Congress reverses it.
101
  Similarly, if the President has refused 
recognition, Congress can acknowledge sovereignty.
102
  Justice Story qualified these statements, 
however, by making clear that they are “still open to discussion” because “[t]he constitution has 
expressly invested the executive with power to receive ambassadors, and other ministers” but 
“[i]t has not expressly invested congress with the power, either to repudiate, or acknowledge 
them.”103  The Constitution makes clear only that the judiciary can take no notice of a sovereign 
until it has ben “duly recognized by some other department of the government.”104 
 Early courts examining the relationship between Congress and the President alluded to a 
shared recognition power.  Only one year after Hutchings, the Court in United States v. Palmer 
stated, 
when a civil war rages in a foreign nation, one part of which separates itself from 
the old established government, and erects itself into a distinct government, the 
courts of the Union must view such newly constituted government as it is viewed 
by the legislative and executive departments of the government of the United 
States.
105
 
 
Additionally, in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., where the Court considered recognition of two 
competing Mexican governments, it stated, “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our 
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-‘the political’-
departments of the government.”106  
 On the other hand, leading Supreme Court cases addressing the recognition power 
deferred to executive authority over recognition.  The Court in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 
v. United States accepted as “conclusive” a determination by the State Department on the 
                                                 
101 Id. (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 195–6 (2d ed. 
1829)). 
102 Id. 
103 STORY, supra note 98. 
104 Id. 
105 16 U.S. 610, 643 (1818) (emphasis added). 
106 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (emphasis added). 
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recognition of the Soviet Government.
107
  Similarly, in United States v. Belmont, the Court stated 
that the “Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of [] government” in recognizing the 
Russian government.
108
  Furthermore, the Court noted that, as distinguishable from the treaty-
making power, the President did not require the consent of Senate in doing so.
109
  More recently, 
in National City Bank v. Republic of China, the Supreme Court determined that “[t]he status of 
the Republic of China in our courts is a matter for determination by the Executive and is outside 
the competence of this Court.”110  Most notably in this case, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of the “President’s plenary power to recognize foreign 
sovereigns.”111  Other circuits have also acknowledged the executive’s plenary power over 
recognition.
112
 
                                                 
107 Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 138 (1938).  Note, however, this case also involved 
a question of executive versus judicial recognition.  Id.  Congress never weighed in on the matter and the Court, 
notably stated that recognition is to be determined by the “political department” of government.  Id. at 137–38 
(“What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a 
judicial question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government. Objections to its 
determination as well as to the underlying policy are to be addressed to it and not to the courts.”). 
108 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1942) 
(“[F]ull recognition…certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations….Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign 
relations requires no less. Unless such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously 
diluted….We would usurp the executive function if we held that that decision was not final and conclusive in the 
courts.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
109 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330. 
110 Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political recognition is exclusively a function of the executive.”). 
111 Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229–(1942)). 
112 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Republic of China, 254 F.2d 177, 186 (4th Cir. 1958) (“In the United 
States and in Great Britain it is established that the courts of the country must accept the action of the executive 
branch of their nation in recognizing the existence and authority of the government of a foreign state; and this action 
is binding upon the courts…”); Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892, 894 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The 
recognition of foreign governments is a function of the executive branch and is wholly outside the competence of 
the judiciary.”); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Recognition is a 
matter as to which the courts are bound by the Executive Branch's determination.”); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 
160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Nat’l City Bank, 348 U.S. at 358 (1955 ) (“It is firmly established that official 
recognition of a foreign sovereign is solely for the President to determine, and ‘is outside the competence’ of 
courts.”); Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution commits to the Executive Branch alone the authority to 
recognize, and to withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes.”). 
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 Although early sources were mixed, the Supreme Court’s experience over the last century 
indicates the judiciary currently leans toward reading the recognition clause as both a plenary 
and substantive executive power.  Further, despite the mixed evidence, many scholars seem to 
accept that the recognition power extends to determining which foreign governments the United 
States should recognize or refuse to recognize.
113
 Some cite practical considerations to evince a 
need for plenary executive recognition power—“[a] concurrent authority in two independent 
departments to perform the same function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward 
in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.”114  This necessarily places the case in Justice Jackson’s 
third category of presidential authority.
115
  If courts recognize the recognition clause as plenary, 
§ 214(d) must be unconstitutional if it intrudes on the President’s exercise of that power. 
IV. Is § 214(d) An Encroachment on the Executive’s Plenary Recognition Power? 
If the court adopts the plenary reading of the recognition clause, § 214(d) is 
unconstitutional if it conflicts with the executive’s policy of not recognizing Israeli sovereignty 
over Jerusalem.
116
  The question then becomes whether, by asking the Secretary of State, upon 
request, to list “Israel” as the place of birth of an American citizen born in Jerusalem, Congress 
“recognized” Israeli sovereignty of Jerusalem.  This involves interpretation of § 214(d)’s purpose 
and effect. 
                                                 
113 HENKIN, supra note 44, at 43 (2d ed. 1996); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 204 (1987) (“Under 
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116 Brief for the Appellee, supra note 10. 
 22 
According to Zivotofsky, § 214(d) does not implicate the recognition power at all; he 
“does not claim that the statutory provision in question represents an attempt by Congress to 
dictate United States policy regarding the status of Jerusalem.” 117  Rather, Zivotofsky  
contends in effect that Congress has the power to mandate that an American 
citizen born abroad be given the option of including in his passport and Consular 
Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) what amounts to a statement of personal belief 
on the status of Jerusalem.
118
 
On the one hand, § 214(d), by its terms, does not instruct the executive to alter its policy 
regarding Jerusalem’s status.  Rather, in Zivotofsky’s view, § 214(d) can be construed as a 
narrow, ministerial, and non-mandatory act permitting citizens born in Jerusalem to self-
identify.
119
   
If the Act can be read as merely ministerial, the court is obligated to read the statute as 
such so as not to implicate the recognition issue.  Ambiguity as to the purpose and effect of a 
statute must be resolved so as to avoid constitutional issues.
120
  § 214(d) states: 
RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR PASSPORT PURPOSES.—
For purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of 
a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary 
shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the 
place of birth as Israel.
121
 
 
The statute begins by limiting designation of Jerusalem as place of birth simply “for the purposes 
of” passports and consular reports of birth.  Furthermore, the Secretary need not list Israel in the 
passports of all citizens born in Jerusalem.  Rather, the Secretary only does so “upon the request” 
                                                 
117 Zivotofsky 1, 132 S. Ct. at 1436  (Alito, J. concurring in the judgment). 
118 Id. at 1436. 
119 Id. 
120 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
(“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
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121 FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, PL 107–228, September 30, 2002, 116 Stat 1350 
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of American citizens born in Jerusalem.  Because it is limited to this scope, § 214(d) need not be 
read as purporting the change the United State’s recognition policy.122   
 On the other hand, read in context with the other sections of the statute, § 214(d)’s 
purpose seems to be an attempt to rework the policy of the United States with regard to 
Jerusalem.  Section 214(b) limits appropriated funds to diplomatic facilities in Jerusalem under 
the supervision of the United States Ambassador to Israel.
123
 Section 214(c) limits appropriated 
funds to government documents recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
124
  The title of the 
statute is an even more blatant exhibition of congressional intent, reading, “United States Policy 
with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel.” 125 Read together, the purpose of the Act is 
clearly to work a change in American policy with regard to Jerusalem.  Further, § 214(d) states, 
“[t]he Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen…record the place of birth as Israel.”126  
The word “shall” is understood as “the language of a command.”127  Although a statute must be 
interpreted so as to give effect and avoid constitutional issues, that general rule is not applicable 
                                                 
122 See Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (“We must not confuse the problem of appellant's 
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here because the statute, read as a whole, is unambiguous in its purpose.
128
  Where a statute is 
unambiguous, constitutional avoidance is inappropriate.
129
   
 Even if § 214(d) is an attempt to rework United States policy, it might be read as a “sense 
resolution.”  Where Congress does not have the power to legislate on a particular issue, it may 
still assert its influence through the passage of a resolution “expressing the ‘sense’ of the 
Congress about some international matter, or calling on the President to do something.”130  A 
sense resolution is particularly significant where it reflects public opinion, as was seen in Henry 
Clay’s 1821 non-binding bill urging the President to recognize the South American provinces as 
a result of American citizens’ public interest.131  Congress can assert its “sense” by refusing 
appropriations.
132
  In the past, Presidents have sometimes upheld these resolutions, but made 
clear to foreign governments that these non-legislative resolutions do not speak for the United 
States.
133
 
 The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 is an example of a “sense” resolution.  The 1995 
Act was passed with the purpose of initiating the relocation of the United States Embassy in 
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
134
  It purported to set a deadline for the move, with the 
establishment of the embassy in Jerusalem to be completed by May 31, 1999.
135
  The 1995 Act 
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also authorized the appropriation of funds for the purpose of establishing an embassy in 
Jerusalem.
136
  There is a critical distinction, however, between § 214 and the Jerusalem Embassy 
Act.  While the 1995 Act gives the President a waiver allowing him to suspend the enactment for 
six months at a time if he determines it is necessary to protect national security interests, § 
214(d) contains no waiver.
137
  As such, § 214(d) intrudes on the executive’s recognition power 
because its purpose clearly attempts to rework United States policy with regard to Jerusalem.   
Section 214(d) might, however, be sustained by learning from the experience of a similar 
statute.  In 1994, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 
and 1995.
138
  Section 132 of the act, entitled “Record of Place of Birth For Taiwanese-
Americans,” states, “For purposes of the registration of birth or certification of nationality of a 
United States citizen born in Taiwan, the Secretary of State shall permit the place of birth to be 
recorded as Taiwan.”139  Although the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China 
as official sovereign over Taiwan, the Department of State nonetheless adopted the statute 
without issue.
140
  Prior to the enactment of the statute, China had objected so strenuously to 
designating “Taiwan” as place of birth on American passports that it refused to endorse visas on 
American passports listing “Taiwan” as the holder’s place of birth.141  In enacting the law, the 
Department of State merely issued a bulletin noting, 
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although issuing offices may now enter ‘Taiwan’…the United States does not 
officially recognize Taiwan as a state….The United States recognizes the government 
of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and 
acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a 
part of China.
142
 
 
The current Foreign Affairs Manual utilized by the Department of State contains a similar 
statement clarifying United States policy with regard to the recognition of Taiwan.
143
 
 Zivotofsky argues that, because there is no meaningful difference between the Taiwan 
statute and § 214(d), the same should hold true for American citizens requesting that Israel be 
recorded as their place of birth.
144
  The Secretary responds by emphasizing that  
[t]he State Department began listing Taiwan only after determining that doing so 
would be consistent with the United States’ recognition that the People’s Republic 
of China is the ‘sole legal government of China’ and acknowledgement of the 
Chinese position that ‘Taiwan is a part of China….As is demonstrated by the care 
taken in addressing the Taiwan question and by the detailed regulations regarding 
place names throughout the world, a determination as to whether use of a place 
name is consistent with United States’ policy involves quintessential foreign-
policy judgments based on the respective facts of each situation.
145
 
 
According to the Secretary, the care taken with the Taiwan situation exhibited its determination 
that listing Taiwan did not contravene American policy.  The Secretary, however, offers no 
explanation regarding how this assessment was made but only gives a blanket statement that the 
statute did not contravene with its recognition policy toward Taiwan.
146
  Judge Edwards, in his 
concurring opinion for the D.C. Circuit, agreed with this position, stating that because recording 
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‘Taiwan’ did not contravene the Executive’s assessment, the statute was constitutional.147  He 
contrasted Zivotofsky’s case because, here, the State Department “has determined that recording 
Israel…misstates the terms of this country’s recognition of Israel.”148  Judge Edwards concluded 
that, because the President has plenary power to establish policies governing recognition, he can 
treat “different situations differently,” depending on his assessment of the situation.149   
 The Secretary and Judge Edwards’s common position raises the issue of presidential 
accountability.  Is it wise to allow the executive to issue abstract and unexplained decisions in 
foreign policy, unchecked by either of the other federal branches of government?  The 
Secretary’s position seems to fly in the face of the system of checks and balances intended by the 
Framers.  The “unitary executive” theory is informative in this analysis.  
V. Unilateral Executive and the Recognition Power 
 The “unitary executive” theory is important to the § 214(d) analysis because it solves the 
questions left unanswered by the recognition clause.  Specifically, because the historical analysis 
of the “receive ambassadors” clause is mixed, the D.C. Circuit will need to rely on prudential 
concerns in determining whether the President should have sole recognition authority.  The 
unitary executive theory resolves the issue by asking whether the President must have plenary 
power to control execution of the laws.
150
   
Derived from the Vesting Clause of Article II, which provides that “the executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” the unitary executive theory 
suggests that all federal administrative and executive powers belong to the President.
 151
  Inherent 
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in this theory is the conventional concept that the Constitution mandates a strict separation of 
powers between the federal branches of government and “efforts within one branch to influence 
or control the exercise of another branch’s powers are illegitimate and should be rejected…”152  
The idea is particularly instructive in looking at Zone 3 Justice Jackson’s tripartite scheme.153  
The unitary executive theory attempts to resolve the problems that arise when the President 
defies Congress by simply “locating the widest possible array of powers in the executive 
branch.”154  With regard to the recognition clause, the unitary executive theory provides the 
President the widest latitude, making the executive’s determination essentially untouchable. 
 The debate over the unitary executive theory revolves around how far the Framers’ meant 
the unitary executive idea to extend.
155
  There are two basic versions of the unitary executive 
theory, a strong and a weak version.
156
  The strong version argues that the President has plenary 
and unlimited power over the execution of administrative functions.
157
  Presidentialist theorists 
point to the Vesting Clause to argue that executive power is measured by the powers associated 
to the British Monarchy in 1787, which is the measure of executive power understood by the 
Framers.
158
  Any attempt to limit executive power, whether through congressional or judicial 
oversight on executive activities, is unconstitutional.
159
  This version can be equated to the 
“presidentialist position” discussed by Peter M. Shane in reference to the President’s power in 
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foreign and military affairs.
160
  According to Shane, the presidentialist position allows the 
President to do almost anything in foreign affairs, subject only to the qualifications specifically 
spelled out in the Constitution.
161
   
The strong version seems to be the one advocated by the Secretary in this case, and by 
many executives in recent history.
162
  Under this view of the unilateral executive, the Secretary’s 
position that the executive may issue blanket decisions with regard to recognition is fully 
warranted.
163
  This puts § 214(d) in a precarious position.  The executive can make a bare 
assertion that one situation is simply different from another, as with Taiwan and Jerusalem.  Any 
position taken in favor of this approach makes the President’s decision untouchable by Congress 
or the judiciary. 
 The alternative to this position, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is the weak version of 
the unilateral executive theory.
164
  Proponents of the weak version argue that the Vesting Clause 
should be interpreted to give the executive no power beyond those powers specifically 
articulated in Article II of the Constitution.
165
  Under this view, also referred to as “congressional 
supremacy,” Congress has wide latitude to structure nonexecutive functions, such as 
policymaking, exercised by the executive.
166
  As a result, the President has no powers in foreign 
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affairs other than those explicitly assigned in Article II or authorized by Congress in legislation 
except in emergencies precluding congressional action.
167
 
 The problem with both of these versions is that neither “square[s] neatly” with the 
Constitution’s text or history.168  First, as to the presidentialist view, much of Article II would be 
redundant if the Vesting Clause were meant to give the President all monarchial authorities 
except the stated limitations.
169
  Specifically, in this case, the receive ambassadors clause 
becomes superfluous because monarchial executive powers already included it.
170
  It is 
inconceivable that the Framers’ would have embraced an executive with full monarchic 
powers.
171
  Moreover, the practical ramifications of this idea are great.  Under the strong unitary 
executive, the President’s powers over war and foreign affairs are plenary and exclusive, not 
subject to oversight by the other branches.
172
  The theory tells us, “aside from political 
accountability, presidential power must remain unrestrained by the niceties of the law.”173 
On the other hand, as to the congressional supremacy view, the Framers and early 
Congresses understood that the President’s foreign and military affairs powers extended beyond 
those articulated in the Constitution.
174
  Further, adoption of a weak unitary executive theory is 
unworkable in practice.  The recognition power implicates day-to-day relations with other 
nations and the United States “must be able to speak with one voice on such issues as whose 
consent is necessary before entering foreign territory, who can bind a foreign country 
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internationally, what is the proper disposition of its assets in the United States, and who can 
speak for the country in United States courts.”175   
The solution is a middle ground between a strong and a weak executive in order to create 
better executive accountability while preserving the system of checks and balances envisioned by 
the Framers.  A middle ground approach is the best solution because it recognizes that neither 
political branch can be neutral because “politics is at its core, in the sense that value judgments 
are pervasive,” making democratic controls on policymaking crucial.176  Jack M. Beerman 
articulates why resolving separation of powers disputes by simply determining which branch 
properly holds that power is the best approach: 
As the Framers made clear, the idea of separation of powers is not to assign a 
power to each branch and then give that branch a free hand in exercising that 
power. Rather, they understood that the whole idea of separation of powers is to 
condition government action on agreement among multiple centers of power. For 
this to work, each branch must have a way to check the others. If powers were 
clearly assigned to branches, checking might still occur though informal 
bargaining, but such checking is likely to be less robust than when more than one 
branch has a colorable claim of authority in a substantive area.
177
 
 
Although this creates greater competition for control, it is “the essence of separation of powers 
with checks and balances.”178   
 A middle ground view of executive power means that, even if modern courts and scholars 
view the recognition power as both plenary and substantive, Congress should nevertheless be 
able to create informal checks on the President’s authority.  This can be accomplished through 
the use of sense resolutions encouraging the President to take particular action or other bills 
refusing appropriations where the President’s recognition policy goes against popular opinion.179  
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Another way to check the President’s recognition power is through the use of bills such as § 
214(d) and § 132 of the 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization Act.
180
   
VI. Conclusion 
American citizens born in Jerusalem are set apart from others as a result of the United 
States policy of not recognizing Jerusalem to be part of any nation.  Although Congress 
attempted to change this with the passage of § 214(d), affording citizens the right to have 
“Israel” listed as their birthplace, the Department of State has refused to enforce the statute, 
claiming that it is unconstitutional.  The political debate arising from this seemingly innocuous 
statute has endured for nearly a decade, touching on questions left unresolved in the Constitution 
since its inception.   
The ultimate solution to resolving the debate over the recognition power lies in 
reinforcing a system of checks and balances.  With regard to the problem in Zivotofsky, this 
solution calls for a greater check on the President’s recognition power rather than simply finding 
§ 214(d) unconstitutional at the President’s bare assertion that the statute intrudes upon his 
recognition power.  Allowing the difference in treatment between Taiwan and Jerusalem without 
explanation is unacceptable, putting the executive “above traditional constitutional checks and 
balances and essentially mak[ing] the president a temporary monarch.”181  This has great 
implications for similar situations that arise in the future because any sitting President’s bare 
assertion that his or her recognition decision is or is not appropriate in a given situation can upset 
the course of foreign relations tracked by Congress and previous presidents.   
In this case, the effect of allowing American citizens born in Taiwan to list “Taiwan” as 
their birthplace cannot be distinguished from allowing citizens born in Jerusalem to list “Israel.”  
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Although China objected strenuously to the Taiwan statute, there was no political backlash other 
than China’s refusal to endorse visas on those passports.182  On the other hand, according to the 
Secretary of State, any act by the American government to prejudge the statute of Jerusalem 
could undercut the United States’s legitimacy as a major political player in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process by 
signal[ing], symbolically or concretely, that it recognizes that Jerusalem is a city 
that is located within the sovereign territory of Israel would critically compromise 
the ability of the United States to work with Israelis, Palestinians and others in the 
region to further the peace process.
183
 
 
To this effect, the Secretary argues, “Palestinians would view any United States change with 
respect to Jerusalem as an endorsement of Israel’s claim to Jerusalem and a rejection of their 
own.” 184  The experience of this litigation, however, shows otherwise.  In the decade since 
Zivotofsky first appeared on a court docket, the issue has received no public attention in the Arab 
world.  Nor has any Palestinian or Arab interest group submitted an amicus curiae brief 
contending that § 214(d) should be struck down.
185
  It seems “the sky will not fall…if all or some 
of the approximately 50,000 American citizens born in Jerusalem carry passports that say 
‘Israel’.”186 
 Because this case is indistinguishable from the Taiwan statute, the D.C. Circuit should 
uphold § 214(d) as a check on the President’s recognition power.  As in the Taiwan case, the 
executive may issue a bulletin clarifying the United States’ policy with regard to Jerusalem.187  
Allowing § 214(d) to stand accomplishes the goal of presidential accountability and fosters 
checks and balances by precluding the President from simply treating “different situations 
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differently,” instead forcing him to produce real evidence showing that a particular policy 
impedes foreign policy objectives.   
  
 
 
